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In early December, the U.S. President hosted the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a truce. His pledge was an end to long-standing fighting in the volatile eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Shortly after, however, a completely opposite approach to conflict emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, targeting sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President warned, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Change of Direction

These divergent actions encapsulates the defining principle of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a moving away from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on trade and ending wars—despite the fact that this aligns with the nascent air campaign in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a top U.S. diplomat in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative stated this, noting the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Mixed Signals

This pivot is significant, but observers note it is premature to gauge its impact. The approach is complicated by the President’s personal style, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said an analyst for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research predicts this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Diplomatic Disinterest and Strains

In contrast to his recent predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known engagement with African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable dispute has broken out with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Engagement and Targeted Intervention

A comparable confrontation appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the forceful rhetoric may have pushed the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Other Powers

Experts characterize the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the current policy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” she added.